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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of Utah
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
NICK CHONGAS, DECEASED,
Respondent,
-vs.-

Case
No. 7206

PAUL C. PORCKER,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF CASE:
It probably will enable the Court to follow the argument
made herein with more ease if a time table of matters which
are recited in the Statement of Facts in the Brief of Appellant
is available for the perusal of this Court. It follows:

March 1st, 1946: Nick Chongas executes will in favor
Paul C. Porcker.
March 11th, 1946: Nick Chongas was committed to State
Hospital
by the
District
Court
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November -st, 1946: Mr. Chongas was adjudged sane after
a hearing in open Court, opposed by
Paul Porcker.
February 3rd, 1947: Will executed by Nick Chon gas, cut~ing Porcker off with a $1.00 legacy.
February 13th, 1947: Order of recommital signed by
Judge John A. Hendricks of the
Weber County District Court.
February 24th, 1947: William Lepas petitions for letters
of Guardianship. Letters being issued March 20th, 1947.
june 30th, 1947: Chongas petitions for restoration to
capacity, alleging release from State
Mental Hospital.
September 26th, 1947: Chongas restored to capacity by
Second District Court.
March 26th, 1948: Nick Chon gas dies.
April 14th, 1948: State Mental Hospital gets around to
filing notice of release, showing release made that day; "Condition unchanged".
Time has quite a bit to do with this case, and the succession
of events has vital importance in considering the weight of the
testimony. Since the question involved principally is whether
there was evidence to go to the jury on the issue of mental, incapacity, the exact character of that evidence must be scrutinized closely. The evidence will be considered under several subheads:

FIRST: THE ORIGINAL COMMITMENT:
There is in evidence a certified copy of the record from the
Third District Court (Salt Lake County) of which the affidavit
of Paul
C.Quinney
Porcker
setting
Nick provided
Chongas
to be
insane,
the Services
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warrant of commitment signed by the Judge of that Court, and
the return on the commitment were admitted in evidence. The
portion entitled "Physician's Certificate" was not admitted, (Tr.
80). Refusal of the Court to admit this "Physician's Certificate"
in evidence is one of the two Assignments of Error in this appeal. (Br. 10).
The evidence discloses that about March 1st, 1946 Paul
C. Porcker, (Appellant here, and a half-brother of decedent),
brought Mr. Chongas to the office of H. A. Soderberg, of counsel for the proponent here, and told Mr. Soderberg that Nick
wanted a will drawn, (Tr. 52-3). Nick just acquiesced, Mr.
Porcker doing the talking, although Ghonga~ read it once (Tr.
52-3; 54-5; 57). Ten days later Appellant swore to an affidavit
that Mr. Chongas was insane. Mr. Chongas' version of what
happened is:
"I made a will to my brother and then I got sick. He came
up here and asked me to go to Salt Lake and live with him.
I went over to the bank and got sufficient money to take
care of my illness, I stayed one day at my brother's and
then they took me to the County Hospital in Salt Lake City.
I was there a few days. One morning someone came in and
picked me up in my night clothes, and the next thing I knew
I was down in Provo. (He was there two or three months
and no one knew where he was said the witness who detailed this conversation). And finally Mr. Lepas came to
see me and says 'We found Nick' ". (Tr. 20).
This and expense to which the decedent was put, particularly expense in the proceeding for restoration, to sanity, the
guardian's fee which Mr. Porcker sought to obtain (20-1-2)
and the loss of the $1,000 he claimed he had drawn from the
bank and given to Mr. Porcker (Tr. 20; 22; 32) and his belief
that his half-brother was trying to get his money (Tr. 23) were
of importance in explanation of the action of the testator in
cutting off Mr. Porcker with the proverbial dollar.
This dislike by the testator of Mr. Porcker runs all through
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the testimony. Mr. Fowles and Mr. Lepas arranged for the release on probation of decedent some tirrte prior to June 30th,
1946, without consulting Paul Porcker, as Chongas' guardian
(Tr. 19), because testator was very bitter ag!linst his halfbrother. Chongas started conversations with Mr. Soderberg
about changing the will favoring the half-brother while proceedings for restoration to sanity were in progress (Tr. 33),
and reiterated his desires to Mr. Soderberg several subsequent
times before he finally came to see him about drawing the
will.

SECOND: RESTORATION TO CAPACITY:
The petition was filed about August 1, 1946. It was not
disposed of until November 1st following. Testator had been
out of the State Mental Hospital (Tr. 15) some time, before
petition for restoration was filed, on probation to Mr. Lepas.
The petition was contested (Tr. 14-5), and resulted in an adjudication (Prop. Ex. "A") that Chongas was of sound mind,
capable of taking care of himself and his property, and restoring him to capacity.

THIRD: THE SECOND WILL:
It appears that after the conversations about the old will
(Tr. 33) commencing about November 1st, 1946, Mr. Chongas
came to Mr. Soderberg's office alone some ten days or more
prior to February 3rd, 1947, (Tr. 31-2) -he was not brought
there by William Lepas as Appellant erroneously states-Br. 9
and 16) told Mr. Soderberg he wanted to make a new will, to
leave Paul out of it; he wanted to leave his friend William Lepas
something, he told (Tr. 46) of his relatives, that they were
getting old, and he was not sure all were living; he wanted his
property to go to his brothers and sisters and Lepas, or their
survivors (Tr. 47. Mr. Soderberg shortly thereafter drew a will
(Tr. 31) which was in his office, unsigned, on February 3rd,
1 1947, when he was told by William Lepas (Tr. 48) that the
testator
was
in Law
St.Library.
Benedict's
Hospital
and
"wanted
the and
will".
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Lepas and Soderberg were driven to the Hospital by Theodore
Stamos (Tr. 49), entered the sick room together, and found Mr.
Chongas in bed. They had a conversation as to his state of
health (Tr. 34; 61) in which testator told them he had sugar
diabetes, and Chongas asked about the will. Mr. Soderberg read
it to him (Tr. 35; 61) and the testator told Mr. Soderberg that
he had "left out Christ" (Tr. 35-61-2). Soderberg then wrote in
the name of Christ Chongas among the legatees. The date was
changed from January to February. Mr. Stamos then, at testator's request, read it to him in Greek (Tr. 36; 61); the testator
asked Lepas to be a witness, and when told Lepas could not be
a proper witness, requested Stamos and Soderberg to witness
his signature (Tr. 36; 64) whereupon the will was signed by
the testator and the witnesses.
Mr. Soderberg testified to the testamentary capacity of
Nick Chongas from his knowledge of the testator gained in
connection with the proceeding for restoration to capacity, his
talks with him from the time of trial to time the will was signed,
including the consultation respecting the will in_ January, (Tr.
38) Mr. Stamos from the conversation had preceding the discussion of the will, that discussion, and his observation of the
testator at that time (Tr. 66) also testified that Mr. Chongas
then was of sound mind and knew what h~ was doing. He had
known Nick Chongas som~ time. Mr. Fowles from observation
of testator from the time he was released from the hospital to
the time the witness became engaged in attendance at the State
Legislature in January of 1947, also testified ,that Nick Chon gas
was of sound mind at the time the will was signed. (Tr. 7; 15).

FOURTH: THE SECOND COMMITMENT:
The testator went back to State Me'ntal Hospital February
13th, 1947. There is in evidence both Insane File No. 1049 and
Probate File No. 7549 of the Second District Court. The first,
admitted to be the entire file in the matter (Tr. 51) contains a
paper, largely in blank, upon which William Lepas waived notice of time of hearing of application for admission of Mr.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Chongas "an alleged insane person" to the hospital, a minute
entry which recites that "upon the affidavit of William Lepas,
filed herein" and the sworn testimony of said Lepas, it is ordered that said Nick Chongas be "recommited to the Utah State
Hospital for care and treatment", and a Order of Reco!flmitment which recites that Chongas had theretofore been recommitted to the State Hospital from Salt Lake County, released
into the custody of William Lepas, and that "
now surrender the said Nick Chongas and ask that he be recommitted
for further treatment at said Utah State Hospital" and orders
the recommitment. A receipt shows that he was taken to the
hospital the same day. That is all-except the Notice of Release of Patient dated April 14th, 1948.
Mr. Soderberg was present at the time this "recommitment" was taken up, (Tr. 38) as well as testator and Mr. Lepas.
They had tried to get the testator admitted to the Weber County
Infirmary at Roy, without success, as "they didn't have a place
for him" ('!'r. 39) so they went before the judge, to whom
Chongas said that (Tr. 40) he wanted to go back to Provo for
treatment, whereupon without any further examination, with
no physicians present, no testimony as to his mental health, or
as to his competency, the order was made by the judge. "He
(Lepas) was the guardian and he requested that he be returned" said Mr. Soderberg (Tr. 49).
At this point an unusual situation arose. Counsel for Contestant asked a question as to presence of the witness at a hearing "wherein he was alleged to be insane", to which proponent
objected. The following colloquy then took place (Tr. 50-51):
Mr. Hutchinson: I take it the Court wouldn't sign an
order recommiting him unless he was.
The Court: Well sir, you take the wrong position.
Mr. Hutchinson: In what respect, your Honor?
The Court: When a person volunteers and wishes him-
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self to go down there we have to have-sign
a recommitment, or a commitment.
The Court: We don't sign it thinking he is insane; we
sign it thinking he will go down there for
observation. He isn't on a recommitment
deciding him to be insane. Forms are sometimes used that are not just fitting· of the
situation."
Further conversation between counsel and the Court followed in which the Court, without objection from counsel, makes
it clear that the question of the sanity or insanity of testator
was not raised in connection with the recommitment. We suggest the language above quoted reflects quite accurately just
what the Court did, a view supported by the wording of the
order made.
The second "guardianship" proceeding (Probate File 7549)
contains a petition by Mr. Lepas asking for letters upon the
ground that Chongas was "sick and unable to take care of his
property", reciting his original commitment, his being released
on probation, and that he had personally asked recommitment
to the State Hospital. No allegat.ion of mental trouble appears.
The Court's order appointing a guardian is based upon the finding that Chongas had an estate which needed the care of some
fit and proper person. There is also in the file a letter from
the testator, protesting appointment of a guardian, and asserting his fitness to care for his property, an account and report,
and order discharging the guardian and restoring conduct of
his affairs to Chongas about September 26th, 1947. No evi.dence of importance concerning this appears outside the files.

FIFTH: OTHER TESTIMONY:
The only witnesses called by Appellant were one William
Palitsas, Andrew Meintasis, and one of his counsel, William L.
Beezley. Palitsas' evidence (Tr. 85-9) had to do with his experiences with Mr. Chongas as a tenant, up to the time that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testator left for Salt Lake to live with his brother, just prior to
the insanity proceeding. It is printed quite extensively in Appellant's Brief. (Tr. 6-7-8)). It was somewhat contradictory, was
weakened on some points on cross-examination, but in view of
the position we take that his condition, prior to his restoration
to capacity, is not revelant, we shall not discuss it further.
Andrew Meintasis' testimony (Tr. 81-85) is partially given
in the Appellant's bfief. (Br. 5). He saw Chongas something
like a month or two prior to his death, had not seen him for
several years prior to that time, and at that time Chongas was
"jumpy" and talked incoherently. He had been told that the
testator had been in the "Asylum", (Tr. 84) but when asked if
he formed his opinion of the testator's mental condition with
that fact in mind, he d-ucked the question completely, and after
being pressed several times, gave his position as to how he
formed it as follows (Tr. 85):
"I made it just like a doctor would. A psychiatrist, I read
it to thought he. ~asn't all there, and that is my true statement.-That was my opinion, of course. I might have been
mistaken about it."
(C) William L. Beezley. This witness was called to impeach on one point the testimony of the· Proponent. Mr. Fowles.
He recalled Mr. Fowles telling him that Chongas was "crazy
as a bedbug", and Mr. Fowles recalled a quite different version
of the conversation. (See Appl. Br. 9 for detailed statements of
the two witnesses).
(D)

Other evidence.

It appeared that the testator was "thrifty" to the point of
stinginess, so that he was unwilling to be hospitalized at the
Dee Hospital, but sought admission to the Weber County Infirmary and that failing, recommitment to the Utah Mental
Hospital. (Fowles at Tr. 10); although Mr. Soderberg didn't
think him "ultra stingy, just saving" (Tr. 53). He later was a
resident at Weber County Infirmary and died there.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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SIXTH: OFFERED AND REJECTED TESTIMONY:
Contestant produced one Dr. Earl Wight, a physician and
surgeon of Salt Lake City, who, without being sworn, was asked
a hypothetical question which embraced the statement that
Chongas was suffering froin dementia praecox at the time of
his first commitment. The testimony was offered to illustrate
the use to which Appellant's counsel desired to put the "Physician's Certificate" contained in the original commitment papers. The offer was denied, upon the ground that the "PhysiCian's Certificate" was not competent to establish that Chongas
suffered from dementia praecox. The testimony of the doctor
was not offered in the presence of the jury, and the rulings of
the Court made thereon are not assigned a$ errors here.

ARGUMENT

Appellant's Assignment No. 1
Respondent contends that the evidence adduced was not
sufficient to carry to the jury the question of testamentary
incapacity, and, of course, if that be true, that the motion for
new trial was rightly denied.
Moser v. Zion's Co-op Mere. Inst. (Utah Unrep.) 197
Pac. 2d 136.
We have no quarrel with the points of law which Appellant
cites, particularly when the cases from which quotations are
made are examined. Several of these cases we will discuss subsequently in our brief. At this time we call attention to the fact
that the Van Hooten and Cissel (not Sissel) will cases involved
advanced and incurable insanity, and wills which were not consonant with lucid reasoning, while in the Etchen case, the incompetent was claimed to have been "weak minded, normally
incompetent, without any natural powers to protect himself"
which feeble minded condition so claimed naturally involved
proof of a lifetime condition. See
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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In re Van Hooten's Will, 124 N. W. 886 (Ia.).
In Re Cissel's Estate, 66 Pac. 2d, 779 (Mont.).
Etchen v. Texas Company, 199 Pac. 212 (Okla.).
The question involved here is not admissability of proof as
to prior and subsequent insanity, guardianships, and similar
testimony, but is the effect of such testimony upon this will
herein admitted to probate. It is 'our position that none of the
testimony offered supports the theory of mental incapacity at
the time the will was made. Appellant says (App].. Br. 17) that
he relies upon ( 1) the commitment, (2) recommitment, (3)
guardianship matters involving person and property of the
decedent, ( 4) releases of Utah State Mental Hospital, Deceased's
confinement in St. Benedict's Hospital and the Weber County
Infirmary, and (5) oral evidence. Analysis of the probative
, effect of these matters follows:

FIRST: THE SALT LAKE PROCEEDINGS. T~ere is in
evidence here the greater part of an insanity proceeding in the
Salt Lake District Court, and some oral evidence which indicates that, upon the commitment, Appellant obtained letters
of Guardianship of his half-brother's estate. There is also testimony of one William Palitsas, at whose hotel the testator lived
for some four or five months prior to removing to the home
of his brother in Salt Lake for one day, and of which nothing
need be said except that it indicated that Nick Chongas was
ill much of the time, thought he was going to die, eccentric, a
patient in the S. P. Hospital at San Francisco, Palitsas said
he had no mind at all at the time he went to his brother's.
This testimony is entirely without probative value because,
something like eight months later, Nick Chongas was adjudged
to be sane and restored to capacity upon a proceeding, had
before the same District Court, contested by the Appellant.
"An adjudication of insanity is prima facie evidence of
testamentary incapacity where it precedes the execution
of the will. In such a case, continuance of insanity will be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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presumed and the onus cast upon the propounders of the
will to show that the disqualification has been removed.
"Having been found a lunatic, the law presumes the
state of his mind to continue unchanged until the contrary
is made manifest."
Clark v. Trail, 1 Met. 35 (Ky.).
"We think the true rule to
insanity is not conclusive, but
and that a person who deals
person may show at the time
had sufficient mental capacity

be that an adjudication of
prima facie evidence only,
with the supposed insane
the coQ.tract was made he
to make it.'.'

Eagle v. Peterson, 206 S. W. 55; (Ark.) 7 A. L. R. 553.
"The adjudication in 1902 by the Supreme Court of New
York, declaring that he was competent to manage himself
and his affairs was not a conclusive adjudication that he
was then sane. Prior to that judgment, the legal presumption would be that the insanity, previously adjudged to
exist, would continue. Thereafter the legal presumption
would be that he was sane.-After the adjudication in
1902, that he was competent, the disputable presumption
that he was sane arising therefrom, was subject to contradiction by competent evidence."
In Re Baker's Estate, 168 Pac. 88 (Cal.).
"As to point 4, that the judgment of the county court
adjudging the allottee to be a competent person raised a
presumption of law which should be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence, while perhaps true as a general prop-.
osition of law, it is not applicable here, or at least not controlling, for the reason that there had been several adjudications in reference to this boy's mind and his competency
to manage his estate, one of which being subsequent to the
adjudication relieved upon by the plaintiff in error."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Etchen v. Texas Company (Supra-see page 216).
And where subsequent to an insanity commitment, the
father of the incompetent procured her discharge from the
asylum by giving bond, under substantially the proceeding
authorized by Utah Statutes, and as William Lepas and j. Francis Fowles procured the release of Nick Chongas, about three
months, (substantially the same time) after her commitment,
the question of her sanity being at issue upon a deed, the
lower court, the commitment being admitted, testimony given
by some eleven inexpert witnesses as to her want of sanity at
various times, other than the time of execution, ordered the
deed cancelled. In that case the appellate court set aside th~t
judgment, holding that it was without substantial evidence to
·support it, thus refusing to give any effect to the presumptio.
of insanity arising from the commitment under the given circumstances.
Wade v. Sayre, 123 S. E. 59 (W.Va.).
Thus the law is that, when the Court adjudged Nick Chongas to be sane, the whole effect, as testimony, of the previous
commitment, guardianship, and evidence as to his prior condition, ceased to have weight. It was admitted solely because it
cast forward a presumption of continuance of the condition
then shown; it had no weight when that presumption ended upon
legal proof of sanity. And while as to third persons, the law
may be that such an adjudication of sanity creates also only a
new presumption and is not conclusive, where, as here, the
person who now offers that former adjudication to prove insanity nearly a year later is he who contested the adjudication
of sanity while the testator was alive, and could be heard to
speak for himself, he might well be concluded by the judgment
of November lst, 1946. We thing it unnecessary to press this
further however:
"But such evidence as to the mental condition of the
testator before or after execution of the instrument in
question is important only in so far as it tends to show
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mental condition at the time of execution thereof; it has

no probative value unless it raises an inference of mental
incapacity at the time of execution of the instrument."
168 A. L. R. 972, (note and cases cited).

SECOND: EFFECT OF RECOMMITMENT, AND SUBSEQUENT GUARDIANSHIP.
As to the "recommitment" on February 13th, 1947, and the
so-called guardianship proceedings which followed~ neither
were of the character which would raise an inference of subsequent insanity, and neither would create a presumption of such
iP,sanity because of the want of validity of the proceedings.

(a)

Neither could raise a presumption of insanity.

When Nick Chongas went before the judge of the Weber
County Court on February 13th, a record was made consisting
of an order, a waiver of notice signed by William Lepas, and
a minute entry. That record, and the testimony of Mr. Soderberg, together with some comment by the Court appearing in
the transcript, are all that there is bearing on what took place
on that day. Mr. Lepas, to whose custody Chongas had been
released after his first commitment, appeared before judge
Hendricks, the testator told the judge that he was sick and
needed treatment, and the judge signed an order of recommitment. Lepas and Soderberg prior that day had sought to get
the testator admitted to the Weber County Infirmary at Roy,
but it was full. (Tr. 39) "So Nick says: 'I want to go back to
Provo, so I can get some medical treatment.-! need some insulin and other care.'-That is what he said in court." No physicians were there, no examination was made, nothing was said
about his mental condition.
The record bears out this testimony. The order of recommitment is of the character which would be used by a person
to whose custody, under our statute, a person is released from
the State Hospital, and who is surrendered by that person for
recommitment. "He (Lepas) was the guardian and he asked
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,13
administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that he be returned." (Tr. 49). The minute .entry recites that
Lepas filed ·an affidavit, but the fact that no such affidavit is
in the file, and the testimony, uncontradicted, that none was
filed, dispute that fact, and of course speculation as to what
the affidavit said, if there was an affidavit, would not aid Appellant's case.
It then is the fact that the recommitment affords no evidence that on February 13th, 1947, Nick Chon gas had suffered
a relapse into his former condition of insanity.

Subsequent to that,, Lepas filed a petition to be named as
guardian of Nick Chon gas' estate. (Probate File No. 7549). This
petition recited that the testator having "entered" the Utah
State Hospital' about March 13th, 1946, and about August,
1946, having been released therefrom, having returned to Ogden and lived with the petitioner until February 13th, 1947,
had at his own request been "recommitted to said institution,
and he is now in said HospitaL-That said Nick Chongas is sick
and unable to take care of himself and his property." The statute applicable to such appointments, Section 102-13-20, Utah
Code Ann. 1943, defines those who may require guardianship
as:
"Any person, who though not insane, is, by reason of
old age, disease; weakness of mind, or from any other
cause, unable, unassisted, to properly manage and take care
of himself and his prop€rty, and by reason thereof would
be likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful and designing persons."
Upon the effect of such a recommitment, no cases have
oeen found. We should not expect much success in that search,
since the proceedings were not· of a character likely to occur
often, nor likely to be reviewed by appellate tribunals. But on
the effect of such a guardianship proceeding, there is ample
authority, and we think that its ratio decendi is equally applicable to the question of the probative value of commitment
and
guardianship. That rational rule of decision is simply that
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such proceedings, unless founded on insanity, create no presumptive evidence of insanity. The proceedings here not only
are not based upon any charges of insanity, but the facts appearing as to them, uncontradicted, indicate that insanity did
not enter into either. We cite:
Where the facts surrounding appointment of a guardian
negative any presumption that want of capacity was involved,
no inference of want of testamentary incapacity arises from
such appointment:
In Re Bottger's Estate, 129 Pac. 2d 518 (Wash:).
Where will was made at about same date petition for
guardianship was filed by children; the petition was contested, at eve of trial, testatrix. told lawyer she could not
bear to take stand against children, it would kill her, required him to attempt settlement. Result, letters issued
some time latter, upon finding testator was 92 years old,
unable to read or write English, without business experience, and that she consented to appointment of guardian.
Court says:
"We are of the opinion that the fact that a guardian has
been appointed to conserve the estate of one adjudged to
be incompetent to manage it herself does not necessarily
tend to establish lack of capacity on the ward's part to execute a will, (whether the adjudication of incompetency
precedes or follows the execution of the will), unless ·the
order appointing the guardian is based upon an express
finding of some mental defect inconsistent with the possession of the capacity required for the execution of a
will. The appointment of a guardian is not an adjudication
that the ward is insane nor does it in all cases imply that
the ward is not fully capable of making a valid testamentary disposition of her property."
In Re Cowdrey, 77 Vt. 359; 3 Ann. Cas. 70.
Testatrix was old, public charge for many years, unexpectedly inherited $6,000'.00-a large sum at that time. She
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asked for appointment of guardian under a statute which
the Court interprets an affording guardianship in just such
cases as does our Section 102-13-20. (supra). Held
"Adjudication of mental incapacity- to take care of herself or her property and the appointment of a guardian
thereunder did not render her prima facie mentally incapable of making a will."
Keenan v. Scott, 225 Pac. 906 (Okla.). (Cited by Appellant).
Ross made deeds on August 4, 7, 11th-killed a negro on
August 12th, was adjudicated insane and admitted to mental hospital August 13th, and his guardian thereupon appointed sued to set aside the deeds. Evidence of a brother
was given, of statements by Ross indicating delusions, and
evidence by Notary who witnessed deeds and others indicating capacity. The Court held the evidence insufficient
to cancel the deeds, saying:
"No question at all had ever been raised as to Ross' incapacity to transact business until the escapade occurred
at Muskogee, evidently on the 12th day of August, wherein
he killed a negro, and the plea of insanity was evidently
interposed at a very opportune time."
I

In re Ames, 67 Pac. 737 (Ore.). (Cited by Appellant).
Ames, accused of sodomy by a stepson and another,
blackmail involved, sought counsel from attorneys who
advised both the making of a will and a request for appointment of a guardian for his estate. Will executed,
guardian applied for and named the same day. Guardianship applied for on ground of poor memory, feebleness, and
that persons were trying to impose on him and defraud
him of his property. On proof of the guardianship, the
lower court held the will invalid for want of testamentary
capacity. Circuit Court, saying that th~ evidence did not
sound provided
and disposing
mindandand
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memory when he made will, directed that will be admitted
to probate and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Kelley v. Stanton, 118 A. 863 (Md.).
Lower court rejected will upon proof of guardianship
some 16 months subsequent to execution, and weak testimony of witness as to incompetency. Appellate Court while
holding evidence of the guardianship proceeding admissable, ruled directed verdict in favor of will should have·
been granted saying:
"It was not, however, conclusive, but its force and effect
depended upon the other evidence in the case, and in the
absence of evidence connecting tht mental condition of
the tes~ator as described by the inquisition with a want of
testamentary capacity at the date of the will, the inquisition alone would be insufficient to show such incapacity."

In Re Dol bear, 86 Pac. 695 (Cal.).
Where proof that testatrix committed suicide less than
three months after executing will, that her mother also
was a suicide, and that her father's family had had insane
members, with some weak evidence from witness as to
mental condition was held insufficient, as against strong
evidence of those who saw her at and about time of making
will and shortly thereafter that she was sane and capable.
The court said:
"The presumption always is that a person is sane. Proof
of insanity carries back no presumption of ~ts past existance."
Keillein v. Krauss, 209 SW 933 (Mo.).
"Such testimony as to mental conditioh at other times
has no probative value as to the mental condition at the
time of execution of an instrument in question in the face
testimony, nowhere directly questioned, that the testator
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was of sound mind and disposing memory at the time the
will and codicil were made."
See also note 168 A. L. R. 972, previously cited.
Tested by the rules laid down in these cases, there is evidently nothing in the records of what took place after the will
was executed which warrants any inference that the testator
was insane at a later date. It is not enough that he was returned
to the Provo Hospital, it is. not enough that he again had his
property placed under guardianship. To create a presumption of
insanity at a later date, the proceedings must have want of
sanity as a basis, and without such want appearing, they create
no presumption that he was insane when the will was made.
They are explainable on another basis.
Chongas may have been guilty of miserliness in seeking
to obtain further treatment from the State Hospital, or may
have simply felt that the treatment for his diabetes there given
had been more beneficial than that had elsewhere. But what
he did to obtain further treatment bespeaks intelligence, not
lunacy.
'

(b) Both proceedings were void and invalid, and invalid
insanity and guardianship proceedings create no presumptions
of insanity, prior or subsequent.
"The adjudication is generally held inadmissable if the
proceeding in which it was made was void. regardless of
the nature of the defect which rendered the proceeding
void."
7. ,A. L. R. 578 and 68 A. L. R. 1312-note (e).
As to invalidity of the order of recommitment, it should
be sufficient to direct attention to the Utah Code provisions as
to recommitment.
First: If he has been released to some relative or friend
under bond, (Section 85-7-28 and 85-7-29) and it is brought to
the knowledge
the judge
that
theprovided
person
thus ofremoved
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Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney of
Law Library.
Funding for
digitization
by the Institute
Museum and Library
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
18 OCR, may contain errors.

not cared for properly, or is dangerous to persons or property,
he may order such person to be returned to the hospital.
Secor1d: If he has been discharged after commitment, and
"has a recurrence of his nervousness", he may be recommited
(Section 85-7-52) by a judge upon application of a guardian,
etc., stating that he "has a recurrence of his nervousness or is
not cared for properly, or is dangerous to persons or property
. and is in need of further care and treatment", the committing
officer "after hearing the evidence and being convinced that
said person is in need of further treatment for his nervous condition" to make an order of recommitment, the form of which
is prescribed by the section, and which differs materially from
that here used.
We direct the attention of the court to the want of any
application, to the complete absence of any showing of the
presence of any of the facts upon which, under either statute,
the Court had power to order recommitment. The whole proceeding rests without any foundation of right or authority in
law. If the order was under the first section, it was made wrongfully because Chongas had been restored to capacity, and had
been discharged. An entirely new insanity proceeding was
requisite in that case. If made under the second section, there
was no application showing that he had a "recurrence of his
nervousness", nor any application at all except Chongras' own
statement that he needed "some insulin and other care." Whatever may have been the opinion of the judge who made the
order, we submit that the statute does not refer to a need or"
care for ordinary ailments, such as diabetes, and that a recurrence which warrants recommitment is recurrence of just such
a mental condition as warranted original commitment. No evidence was heard showing any such condition. The recommitment was plainly invalid.
As to the appointment of Lepas as guardian thereafter,
there was a total want both of pleading and of finding by the
court of either insanity, or of his being not only "sic~ and unable to take care of himself and his property", but also, as the
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statute provides, "and by reason thereof would be likely to be
deceived or imposed upon by artful· and designing persons."
The one statutory requirement is not sufficient, the statute
requires both to concur.
We submit that neither proceeding, upon the record here
made, had validity, and that in the absence of validity, neither
was entitled to be in the record, nor to be considered by the
jury.

Third: Other hospitalization, etc.
Appellant says that in addition to the matters heretofore
discussed he relies upon:
Releases from Utah State Hospital.
Confinement in St. Benedict's Hospital.
Confinement in County Hospital, Weber County,' for
the Indigent.
The release found in Proponent's Exhibit No. 2, and filed
in the Salt Lake Insanity proceedings, was not admitted in evidence (Tr. 80), and its exclusion is not herein assigned as error.
It was properly not admitted since it is without evidentiary
value, hearsay, wanting in relevancy because made long subsequent to the restoration to capacity, evidently a formaJ act
done to close the record. That from Weber Co. File No. 1049,
which recites that "the above patient was discharged, condition
unchanged, from the Hospital April 14th, 1948" is equally irrelevant. Prior to April 14th, 1948, Nick Chongas had left the
hospital, 'which he had entered voluntarily, freely and without
any probation, he had been found sane and. able to handle his
own affairs by the Weber County courts, and had managed
those affairs for months; he had become ill, had died, had been
buried. So he was "discharged April 14th, 1948."
What is claimed for the confinement in St. Benedict's Hospital and what is claimed for the residence at the County Infirmary
counsel
does
not
say.
The 'hospitalization,
theandtime
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the will was made, at St. Benedict's was for diabetes. Has Appellant authority that a diabetic condition creates an inference
of mental unsoundness? That Chongas was able to obtain admission to the County Infirmary where he might find companionship, care, board, room, all at much less expense than
he would have paid for private hospitalization, bespeaks not
insanity, but an acute and informed sanity. He cherished his
hard earned money, and he sought to save himself all expense
he could, and miserliness is not insanity.
To argue about these matters is like hitting at a pi"llow;
there is no substance at which to strike a blow. We submit none
of these matters have probative value upon the question of
the testamentary capacity of Nick Chongas.

Fourth: "Oral Testimony" relied upon.
We have shown that what William Palitsas thought of the
the testator's condition prior to his commitment became immaterial when, and for the same reason, that the evidence of a
higher form that he was insane, the commitment, became immaterial. After his return, Palitsas testified only to seeing
Chongas on one occasion, when he was trying to sell or rent a
house which the witness thought he had already sold (Tr. 91).
This was just after Nick left the hospital (Tr. 93). The record
shows (Tr. 26) that Chongas did have a house, and that he did
sell it after he had been restored to sanity, so that the basis
for Palitsas' attempt to show subsequent insanity, from sale of
what had been sold, falls down.
Andrew Meintasis saw the testator for the first time in two
or three years about six weeks before he died, thought him incoherent, "jumpy", "not all there" but "might have been mistaken about it." At that time, this diabetic was not far from
his final illness. There was no showing that his condition was
not due to the advanced state of his illness, or that what the
witness observed had any connection with a mental condition
had by Chongas at the time he executed his will.
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Mr. Beezley, in impeachment of the testimony of the proponent as to the sanity of the testator, testified that sometime
in the period when Mr. Fowles was in the legislature he had
talked with Fowles who had told him that Chongas "was crazy
as a bedbug" and that he sat on a stoql in a restaurant, all alone,
gazing out of the window. Without commenting upon whether
Mr. Fowles did or did not say that, or upon its weight as impeaching testimony, we submit that the conduct recited certainly did not warrant imputation of want of sanity. He sat on
a stool, all alone, gazing· out of the window of the restaurant.
What else had this lonely man, sick, feeling himself betrayed
by the only relative whom he knew how to find-what else did
he have to· do!
What was the other testimony: None certainly supports
want of testamentary capacity. The record as to possession of
full capacity by Nick Chongas is full of both direct and intrinsic matters in s'upport of the will. The following points are
not disputed:
(a) Chongas had ability to understand 'Yhat he was doing
when he executed the will.
He began to discuss a change in the will which left his
estate to Appellant at the time of the proceedings for restoration to capacity three month before date of execution. He reiterated that at several subsequent times.
He visited Mr. Soderberg-alone let us insist-some ten
days or more before the will was signed, and gave instructions
as to his intentions.
He caught, on first reading of the will to him on February
3rd, the error made by Mr. Soderberg in omitting the name of
a brother from the wilL
He showed caution and an acute desire to be sure the will
carried out his wishes by requesting Mr. Stamos to read it to
him byinthehis
nativ'e
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(b) The will was such as a sane testator might well have
made. He recognized, along with his brothers and sisters, the
friend with whom he had lived, and who had rescued him from
the State Hospital. He omitted provision for the half-brother
who had proferred to take care of him, and then, after one day,
and after getting his $1,000, had sent him first to the County
Hospital, had then caused his commitment, and had opposed his
restoration to capacity. He did not know what had become of
the immediate members of his family, whether they were living
or dead, so he provided for what should occur as to any legacy
which lapsed by death, and saw to it that, if his brothers or sis!ers could not be found, none of his estate would go to Paul
C. Porcker. Given the circumstances which surrounded him,
his want of knowledge as to his family, his dislike of his brother, the will is just what might be anticipated of the most intelligent and sane testator.
(c) The evidence of the attesting witnesses is clear as to
capacity, and was based upon both acquaintance with Mr.
Chongas, and upon observation at the time the will was signed.
It establishes his testamentary capacity at that time, and it is.
not challenged by any of the other evidence .
. Testimony of attesting witnesses, clearly and positively
showing facts warranting their belief in the sound mental condition of the testator, and their conclusions of testamentary
capacity drawn therefrom are ordinarily given great weight by
courts in will contests.
Ann. Cas. 1914 D 343 and cases cited.
123 A. L. R. 89, (note).
In Wade v. Sayre, heretofore cited, ( 123 S. E. 59) upon a
record showing a prior commitment, no restoration, but a discharge on probation, ~nd the evidence of some eleven non-expert witnesses that the grantor of the deed there in dispute
was not sane, opposed by the testimony of the person who took
the acknowledgements that he had examined the grantor separate and apart as to her knowledge of the nature of the act she
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was doing, that she understood and was sane, as well as that of
others as to her sanity at or about the time of the execution of
the instrument, the Court set aside the judgment, although
under the rules of West Virginia the lower court's findings
were to be followed if supported by evidence, saying
"We do not think the bare opinion of non-expert witnesses will overcome the presumption that the plaintiff
was incompetent to make the conveyance at the time it was
made especially in view of the testimony of the officers
, and others present at the time of execution of the same,
who testified that the plaintiff was sane at the time."
In the Bottger and Ames will cases, heretofore cited, the
Appellate Court not only held the evidence insufficient, but
held that the record was such as to require ,the will being established. In Kelly v. Stanton (supra) it was held that the court
should have granted a directed verdict. The rules as to when
such a verdict should be granted are well settled:
"judges need not submit a question to a jury unless there
is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict.-It has been held that an issue should be submitted
to a jury where the evidence has sufficient weight to be
pertinent or conduces in any reasonable degree to establish the fact in controversy, or if there is any credible evi~
dence which, to a reasonable mind, can support an inference, in favor of a party to an action.-Under the modern
doctrines in this regard, an issue should not be submitted
to the jury where there is only a scintilla of evidence, where
the evidence barely raises a conjecture in support of the
view sought to be established, or where there is no substantial evidence." (53 Am. jur. 152).
"Evidence which merely makes it possible for the facts
in issue to be as alleged, or which raises a mere conjecture,
surmise, or suspicion, presents no question of fact for
submission to the jury and should not be left to the jury,
being
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mission to the jury, the proof must be sufficient to raise
more than a mere conjecture or surmise that the fact is
as alleged." (64 C. j. 312).
Excluding the evidence of the first commitment, because its
effect was negatived by the latter finding of sanity, excluding
the matters relating to the return of Mr. Chongas to the hospital, and to the subsequent guardianship proceeding, not only
because they were void and so of no evidentiary value at all,
but also because they were not based upon facts giving rise to
an inference of testamentary incapacity, we have left really
only the testimony of Andrew Meintasis. It seems difficult to
conceive that any jury of reasonable men could find on that
testimony that something over a year earlier, Nick Chongas
had been wanting in such soundness of mind and memory, as
to render his will invalid.

APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT No.2
(a) Exclusion from the record of the so-called Physician's
Certificate is justified, both by the want of compliance with
requirements of law for such a record, and by the matter
therein contained, not properly part of the record, nor responsive to matter to questions therein asked, which were hearsay
and not the best evidence of matters there shown.
The Statutes of this State, (Sections 85-7-21 and 85-7-22,
Utah Code, Ann. 1943) set out the duties of physicians called
in by the Court in insanity proceedings, and the matters which
substantially must appear in the Physician's Certificate to be
filed in such cases.
The first statute cited requires that "after a careful hearing of the evidence, and a personal examination by the physicians of the person alleged to be insane, they shall certify
on oath whether or not the person is insane, whether the case
is of temporary or curable character, whether the person has·
a homicidal, suicidal or incendiary mania, or whether he is
dangerous, if at large, to other persons or to the property of
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the community in which he shall live" and obtain so far as possible correct answers to the questions set out in the statutory
form, which is given in the last section cited. As to these points:
Omitting matter where any substantial or partial compliance with the statutes appears, the following objections lie
to this so-called Certificate.
1. It does not contain the statement, required expressly
by statute, as to whether the case is of temporary or curable
character. No place for such a statement appears in the form.
2. Although the form contains blanks for answers as to
whether the alleged insane person has a disposition to injure
himself, others, or to destroy or burn property, those blanks
are left without answer,. although such answers are explicitly
required.
3. The oath, which contains place for a statement showing that the physicians personally examined Mr. Chongas, is
left blank in that particular. 'Nor do the physicians certify as
to whether Mr. Chongas was or was not psychotic, that his
departure from normal was or was not such as to endanger
health, person or property.
4. The form used does not contain any place for a statement by the physicians of information upon questions Nos.
15, 18, 19, the sub-questions under 23, the first four questions
under 31, No. 33, and No. 34 of the form. Yet the question as
to whether Mr. Chongas had rational intervals, (No. 34), whether there had been a prolonged departure from his usual course
of conduct, (No. 15) as to what peculiarity or defect the physicians noted in the patient (No. 18) and as to what permanent
hallucinations or delusions were noted in the patient (Nos. 18
and 19) are matters very pertinent to the inquiry which was
before the Court in the trial of this case.
To' the question as to when departure from the normal
took place (12th line of the certificate) no answer is given. And
the answers which follow to the other questions in that line
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are largely inept. Certainly for a man who had been treated
for diabetes, as had the testator, to think he had diabetes would
not be a symptom of insanity, particularly when the physicians
themselves certify on the next page that he possibly did have
it. Nor is his having been in the S. P. Hospital for treatment
a symptom of insanity. As to his half brother seeming to be
somewhat afraid of him, that is pure hearsay, no symptom of
anything, and as to this Appellant a very self-serving statement.
At the bottom of this page the following appears:

"Q. Have any relatives suffered from or been treated
for nervous or mental disease?
"Brother says a Dr. Brown of Ogden told him to send
him to Provo."
Admission of this portion of Exhibit 2 in evidence would
have placed that damaging statement before the jury, as part
of a public record, bearing probably to their minds some official stamp of verity. It most certainly is a self-serving statement from the Appellant-it is not responsive, and the purest
hearsay. Appellant certainly knows, if any such statement ever
was made him, what Dr. Brown it was that so stated, but he
did not call that physician as his witness at this trial. The danger of admitting such testimony needs no further argument.
Turning to the next page we find that the physicians set
out, to the question as to what "false ideas" Chongas may have
had:
"Believes his brother is the cause of all his troubles. Has
some somantic complaints. Wanders about in hospital."
That Chongas believed his brother the cause of his
"trouble" is probably true, and if the trouble meant is his incarceration in the County Hospital in lieu of being given residence at the brother's home, which seems to be the only trouble
Nick then was in, the statement is no false idea. Admitted, it
would have had its effect in inducing a jury to believe that
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Porcker's treatment of his brother was not what Chongas described it as being. That Chongas had some somantic complaints
-i. e. was a hypochondriac-falls under the "false idea" head,
but if people who have imaginary illnesses are subjects for incarceration in mental hospitals, many of us would find our
way there, and the state would have to enlarge its facilities
multifold. And what connection there is between the patient,
not bedfast, not voluntarily there, wandering about the hospital, and a "false idea" we are unable to determine.
The whole proceeding, for that matter, hardly conforms
to the requirements of due process. True, the Warrant of Commitment recites that the Court caused "Nick Chongas to be
brought before me for examination as to his sanity," but that
any notice was given him of the hearing, any opportunity to
defend against the charges of Paul Porckas, that the District
Attorney was present to represent the State and see that justice was done,-none of these facts appear. The physicians
show no examination made of the alleged incompetent. Were
Chongas present, himself testifying to what he told Mr. Fowles
as to his being spirited from County Hospital to Mental Hospital
without any knowledge of these proceedings, we would contend that· the proceedings were invalid. In a collateral matter
such as this, the right to do so is somewhat doubtful, if all
statements in the record are given full creoence, and we shall
not spend further time on this. But it's not a good record to
warrant such a commitment.
We submit that this "Certificate" was not admissable because not made in conformity with law, and because it carried with it hearsay evidence, and irrevelant statements not
responsive to the questions to which appended.

(b) Had its admission been proper, still exclusion of this
"Physician's Certificate" did not constitute reversible error.
This was a part of the record of the original insanity pro1ceedings upon which commitment resulted. From it Appellant
claimed
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to base thereupon expert testimony that Chongas, suffering
with that disease, was never thereafter sane.
Respondent while objecting to the admission of the certificate as proof of fact of the statements therein contained, did
not object to its proffer as showing what took place at the
hearing. (Tr. 69) But Appellant insisted upon offering it to
show factual existance of dementia praecox, (Tr. 69) even
claiming that there was an "adjudication" of the facts from that
record. Our position is:
That Chongas was committed to the State Hospital as insane was a fact, a fact established by this record. That he the
physicians believed be was insane from dementia praecox is
likewise a fact, which could be established by this certificate.
Based on it, Appellant desired to prove dementia praecox an
incurable disease, and that, it being incurable, there never
thereafter was a time when Chongas was sane.
The trouble with that argument is that the exhibit does
not establish that he did have dementia praecox. It establishes
only that such was the diagnosis. It could not be substituted
for proof of the fact by direct testimony. The record and its
presumptions ceased to evidence mental incapacity, at the
time of execution of the will, when Chongas' subsequent sanity
and capacity was established by the proceedings for restoration
which created a new and strong presumption of sanity. That
judgment that he was sane negatived the presumption that the
physicians correctly diagnosed his trouble; it established that
he had no fixed, incurable, continuing insanity. Any prior presumptions from the insanity record then ended any right to
base expert testimony on the contradicted presumptions ended.
To hold otherwise would be to create this contradictory
situation: The presumption that he was insane established by
the proven fact of commitment ends, and has no more effect
in the case, but the best guess-Dr. Wight (Tr. 74) said that
is what a diagnosis sometimes is-of the physicians would be
considered as not rebutted. The diagnosis was not admissable
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for that purpose because for that purpose it is not only rebutted, but is hearsay-just as the evidence from Palitsas (Tr.
87-8) as to what Dr. Brown said to him was hearsay, and should
have been excluded on our objection,-and certainly is not
evidence of testamentary incapacity.
It follows that whether or not the Physician's Certificate
was admitted, no reversible error occurred. Admitted it would
have had no more probative weight that the commitment. Admitted, it would not have afforded ground for a question, addressed to an expert witness, based upon the assumption that
Chongas suffered from dementia praecox at the time he executed his will. This Court has held too often that error, which
cannot affect the result, gives no groun~ for reversal for citation of authority to be needed.

We submit that the trial Court's Judgment should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
STUART P. DOBBS
H. A. SODERBERG
Attorneys for Respondent
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